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Successful Collective Action among Village Forest Management Institutions
in the Indian Himalayas

Arun Agrawal
Department of Political Science, University of Florida
Introduction
An increasing number of scholars, development
practitioners, and environmental activists today present
micro-institutional solutions as the remedy for
renewable resource scarcities. Their arguments have
helped to shift attention away from market and state
oriented policies as the only two alternatives for
development and environmental conservation (Anderson
and Grove 1987, Ostrom 1990, and Ostrom, Schroeder
and Wynne 1993). The fresh claims on behalf of the
local (Chambers 1983, Korten 1986, Schmink and
Wood 1992, Uphoff 1986), the indigenous (Cultural
Survival 1993, Denslow and Padoch 1988, and Richards
1985), and the "little community" (Hecht and Cockburn
1990, Scott 1976, Wade 1988) represent a long overdue
move.
The growing focus on community institutions and
indigenous voices recognizes the rupture between the
interests of local populations, national governments
and/or international institutions. But even more
appropriately, the focus on the local marks a shift from
the preoccupation with the centralized, over-arching,
solutions of the past decades that failed to reverse, and
may indeed have contributed to, environmental
problems. The attention to local spaces and
communities fundamentally changes the conversation
on development and conservation. The ensuing study
builds upon the insight in this literature by examining
the relationship between group size and successful
collective action. Contrary to conventional wisdom in
the social sciences (Hardin, 1981; Olson, 1965), I
question the presumption that smaller groups are likely
to be more successful than larger groups.
The study analyzes village van panchayats (forest
management councils) in Almora district in the Indian
Middle Himalayas. These community level councils,
many of them in existence since the 1930s, help
residents utilize and protect forest resources in
accordance with rules they themselves craft and attempt
to enforce. I first describe the process behind the birth
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of van panchayats and resource use in 5 van panchayats.
I then discuss some significant theoretical reasons why
larger groups may be more successful in managing their
forests. In examining the relationship between group
size and collective action, the study makes two major
departures from the norm. Much writing on collective
action focuses on the internal dynamics of a group. This
paper, rather, looks at the external dynamics -- relations
of a group with other groups. Second, it draws a
distinction between mobilizing a group for collective
action and success in meeting the objectives of
collective action. Using these two ideas, it constructs an
argument to show how larger groups may be more
successful than smaller ones.

The Forest Panchayats of Kumaon
A multiplicity of institutional forms occupies the
terrain of resource management in Almora. Three
distinct regimes can be identified -- 1) Reserved forests
controlled by the Forest Department; 2) Civil forests
managed by the Revenue Department, and 3)
Community forests managed by village forest councils
(van panchayats). The activities of van panchayats are
the focus of the investigation.
The history of the van panchayats in the Indian
Himalayas can be traced to the intrusions of the colonial
British state in the early 1800s. From this period
onward, the British government curtailed progressively
the area of forests under the control of local
communities (Guha 1990: 44-5). At the same time it
also enacted elaborate new rules specifying strict
restrictions on lopping and grazing rights, prohibited
the extension of cultivation, sought to regulate the use
of fire that villagers believed led to higher grass
production, increased the labor extracted from the
villagers, and strengthened the number of official forest
guards (Pant 1922).
The new rules stirred villagers into widespread
protest (Ballabh and Singh, 1988; KFGC, 1922: 2).
The often violent protests by village communities
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forced the government to appoint the Kumaon Forest
Grievances Committee to look into the local
disaffection. On the basis of the Committee's
recommendations the government passed the Van
Panchayat Act of 1931. This act empowered village
communities to create Forest Councils and bring under
their own control forest lands that were managed by the
revenue department as Class I and Civil Forests.
(According to Somanathan (1989) the Act only
formalized the control many hill communities had
exercised over their forests before the arrival of the
British. Their informal institutions were called lattha
panchayats. Lattha means a big stick, and the name
evocatively denotes the power the local community held
over its members.)
Nearly 3,000 forest panchayats today formally
control 35% of the hill forests in Kumaon. Of these,
nearly 1,700 exist in Almora alone (Agrawal 1995: 51).
The broad parameters that define the management
practices of these institutions are laid down in the Van
Panchayat Act. But residents also meet frequently to
discuss the rules that will govern extraction of benefits
from forests and create monitoring, sanctioning, and

arbitration devices to resolve the majority of
management questions at the local level (Agrawal,
1994). They elect their leaders from within the
community, select guards to enforce rules, fine rule
breakers, manage finances, and often distribute earnings
for the benefit of the community.

Resources of the Panchayats
The most significant products villagers traditionally
harvest from their forests are fodder, fuel wood, animal
bedding, organic manure, and construction timber.
Figure 1 outlines the importance of forests in the
agricultural and subsistence economy by tracing the
links between forest products villagers harvest and the
kinds of needs such products fill. It is obvious that
forests are the cornerstone of subsistence in the hills,
contributing critical inputs to each element of the
subsistence economy -- the household, agricultural
fields, and livestock rearing. In addition, panchayat
forests containing chir pine (Pinus roxburghii) also
yield resin for turpentine, a commercially valuable
product.

Forests in the Hill Subsistence Economy
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The revenues from the forest products are used to
monitor and guard the resources, and to meet operational
expenses of the panchayat. In some cases, councils have
also had sufficient surpluses to create communal goods
for their villages such as school buildings, or common
utensils used to cook food for the community during
festive celebrations.
Key Actors
The forest councils are embedded in a web of social
and administrative relationships. These relationships
presume the patterns of influence laid down in the
Forest Panchayat Act of 1931, as amended in 1976. The
Act provides support for the van panchayats from the
revenue and to the forest departments for rule
enforcement and the maintenance of vegetation in the
forests but it grants them only limited authority to
enforce rules .1 In 197 6, the overall framework of rules
within which councils operated became far stricter.
Government officials assumed substantially higher
control over the elected officials of the councils. In
addition, new restrictions on day-to-day activities meant
the councils could fine rule breakers only with the
consent of the rule-breaker, or after securing the
permission of higher level government officials. For
major disputes they were required either to move the
judiciary, or rely on aid from the officials of the revenue
department.
As a result, over the last two decades, those forest
councils that have few local resources at their command
have been plagued by rule infractions (Agrawal 1994).
Their elected officials, lacking independent means to
pursue court cases, and the requisite influence to move
the officials of the revenue department, have often been
helpless to enforce the rules they created. Asked in a
meeting to list the four most important problems facing
their panchayats, 30 forest council chiefs listed
problems related to inadequate supervision and local
rule-breaking and monitoring 68% of the time. In

1 Ironically, it is the Indian state after independence
that reduced the local authority of the panchayats even
more than the colonial British state. Forestry and
Revenue department officials, both groups felt that the
Van Panchayat Act devolved too much authority on the
villagers, and that the villagers had not been able to
manage their forests well. In support of their arguments
they pointed to cases where, they argued, locally
powerful individuals had engaged in large scale felling
and had been abetted in some cases by panchayat
officials. Their arguments led the increased restrictions
through amendments introduced to the Act in 1976.
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contrast, problems related to low incomes of the
panchayats were mentioned only 32% of the time.2
At the same time, the officials of the revenue
department who are supposed to help the panchayats
must perform a host of other duties, including the
maintenance of law and order, collection of taxes, and
administration of various development projects. Most
revenue department officials consider these duties to take
priority over the tasks related to forest panchayats. For
many forest panchayats, then, inadequate levels of
enforcement and limited local resources are a major
problem.

The Case Studies
Data on five forest councils form the basis for the
ensuing discussion. All of them are located in the
Dhauladevi Development Block of Almora District.
They range in elevation from 1,100 to 2,000 meters;
their forests lie between 1,400 and 2,100 meters. They
are all close to motorable roads, and are thus more or
less equally exposed to market forces. In all, about 25
villages are located in the watershed of the river
Jataganga in Dhauladevi development block of which 11
possess their own community forests management
councils .3 The rest depend on illegal harvests from the
forests of their neighbors, and forests owned by the
forest or the revenue department. The watershed
represents the situation in most of the Kumaon region.
Forest resources are scarce, and villages compete with
each other for subsistence benefits from forests.
While the selected forest panchayats and their
settlements are situated within the same ecological and
administrative divisions, they differ significantly on
their size, organization, age, and resource endowments.

2 The 30 chiefs of councils listed a total of 97
problems. Of these 31 (32%) related to the low income
of their council, 22 (23%) to inadequate support from
higher level government officials, and 44 (45%) to local
level rule infringements, and problems in monitoring
and enforcement.
3 The selected panchayats were chosen randomly out of
the 11 villages that possess their own community
forests and panchayats in the Dhauladevi development
block.
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TABLE 1

Basic Statistics on the Five Dhauladevi Forest Panchayats
Pokhri

Tangnua

Kana

Kotuli

Bhagartola

Area (ha)

37

56

379

139

179

Cropped area (ha)

12

14

230

36

59

Area of Van Panchayat (ha)

20

25

25

35

63

0.5

0

0

0.5

1

1,100

2,000

2,000

1,700

1,900

10

21

25

50

70

Distance from road (km)
Elevation (M)
No. of households (1993)

As Table 1 indicates, Pokhri and Tangnua are very
small in area as well as number of households, and have
formed their forest councils only recently. Kotuli and
Bhagartola are relatively large. Kana, although it has a
large aggregate area, still possesses only a small
number of households. In Tangnua, the population has
increased in the last two decades, but the number of
households has remained more or less stable.
The average annual number of meetings for Kana,
Pokhri and Tangnua lies between two and four. For
Kotuli and Bhagartola it ranges between 8 and 12. Data
from the meeting records of the first three councils
indicate that they have also been relatively lax in
creating rules to guide user behavior, and ineffective in
en.forcing the rules they have crafted. In part these
differences among the five councils may simply indicate
that because the first three panchayats are younger, their
officials as well as members need more experience in
working with government officials, in interacting with
each other, and in forming and enforcing rules.
Such an explanation would be simple and attractive.
Further examination, however, reveals its invalidity, at
least for the selected councils. Records for meetings of

the Bhagartola and Kotuli forest councils reveal that
they met regularly and often, and crafted a variety of
rules right from the start. Their current organizational
capacity certainly has developed over a period of time,
but this does not mean that time is the explanatory
variable for such capacity.
A more favorable institutional and politicaleconomic climate in the earlier period that helped
establish the authority of the older forest councils might
still be playing a role in their continued survival and
success. However, the current institutional environment
has existed at least since 1976; perhaps, since Indian
independence in 1950. It is difficult to accept that effects
of a supportive environment have lingered on for 20
years or more, when everything around these village
councils has changed. Further, it is important to
understand how the activities and the processes within
the panchayats relate to the macro environment rather
than simply leaving the explanation to the passage of
time.
A second difference that marks the first three
councils is their low budget (see table 2).

TABLE 2

Basic Institutional Information on Forest Panchayats
Tangnua

Pokhri
1989

1988

1991

1962

1939

2

4

4

8

12

Total annual budget, 1990 (Rs)

300

500

670

1750

3800

Per household contribution (Rs)

30

24

27

35

54

Year of formation
Average no. meetings/year
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Bhargartola

Kotuli

Kana
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During the course of their existence, Kana, Polchin,
and Tanguua have seldom been able to raise more than
Rs. 750 a year (Rs. 30.00 equal one US dollar) to meet
their expenses. Nor has their capacity to raise
contributions from villagers increased during their
existence. Kotuli and Bhagartola, however, routinely
raise between Rs. 2,000 and 4,000. Higher aggregate
and per-household contributions from member
households increase the overall capacity of the councils
to hire guards and enforce rules. Since guards are
typically paid around Rs. 200.00 to 250.00 a month,
the smaller councils cannot hire a full time guard for the
more than three to four months in a year.
To some extent, the ability of households to
contribute to the forest councils relates back to the
condition and type of vegetation in the forest itself,
making conclusive assertions hazardous. If villagers
receive little benefit from the forest, they will have
little incentive to protect the forest. In a vicious cycle,
then, the degraded condition of forest will worsen still
further, discouraging future contributions. Too much,
however, can be made of such a connection. In a
condition of generalized poverty in the hills, where few,
if any, of the households can be viewed as prosperous or
even reasonably well-off, why do we find "institutional
robustness" (Ostrom 1990) in some cases, and miss it
in others?

Implications of the study
The salient features of the situation can now be
summarized. A number of forest panchayats compete
with each other in incomes, high dependence on forests
to protect and subsist on their scarce resources. While
the per capita endowment of forest resources is similar
across the panchayats, the smaller forest councils have
somewhat unexpectedly been less successful in
protecting their resources.
The success of the larger panchayats is reflected in
the greater number of meetings held each year, the more
rules crafted, the larger budgets, the higher levels of
monitoring and enforcement, and even a relatively more
dense vegetation cover. The figures for the "total tree
biomass" in table 3 provide some limited indication that
the larger forest panchayats have been more successful
in protecting their forests. 5
According to most
writings that explore the relationship between collective
action and group size, the probability of collective
action becomes progressively bleaker as group size
increases. The data on five forest councils indicate,
however, that smaller groups may find it too arduous to
create viable institutions that will persist over time to
encourage collective actions, or to ensure member
contributions to forest protection.

In the case of the forest panchayats the above
explanation is simply off the mark. The per-capita
forest area in all the panchayats is low, but no lower for
the first three panchayats than for the Bhagartola and
Kotuli, which are more successful. In addition, more
than a third of the residents in all the five cases,
including the less successful first three villages,
initiated the process of forming the councils; most of
the other villagers were willing to experiment. Villagers
in all the five cases find significant proportions of their
subsistence needs for fuelwood, fodder and construction
timber in the panchayat's forests; and even in the
smaller villages, there have been some contributions to
the panchayat coffers. All this indicates that the
problem is somewhat different from "vicious cycle"
postulation. It is related more to the inability of small
groups of poor households to generate a surplus for
protecting commonly owned and managed resources,
rather than to their unwillingness .4

4 It should be obvious that even if the problem is one
of a lack of incentive to contribute in the smaller
communities, the larger argument of the paper holds -smaller groups find it more difficult to successfully
organize collective action.
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5 Since the Kana, Pokhri, and Tangnua forest
panchayats have formed recently, the condition of the
vegetation in their forests, unlike the cases of Kotuli
and Bhagartola, cannot entirely be attributed to the
manner in which the panchayat has functioned. But the
relatively lax enforcement of rules in the three
panchayats implies there will be little improvement in
the condition of the forest.
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TABLE 3

Tree Biomass in Investigated Cases
Pokhri

Tangnua

Bhagartola

Kotuli

Trees per Ha

1103

2104

182511160

2460

1826

Mean tree DBH (em)

.1706

.1487

.117/.1423

.1646

.1572

Mean tree height (M)

7.1

4.5

5.9/8.1

5.3

6.3

Total tree biomass (cuM/ha)

179

166

116/149

301

205

5

9

2317

13

11

16

9

11/9

26

18

No. of tree species
No. of plots sampled

Two reasons can explain the success of larger forest
councils: each relates to protection of forests from
unauthorized users and uses. To protect forests
successfully from generalized pressure on resources,
communities need guards who will enforce rules. But
guards who will monitor the condition of forests and
prevent rule infringements cannot be hired without a
minimum level of surplus. The smaller communities of
poor peasants find it difficult to contribute even the
relatively modest amounts that are necessary to hire a
guard. As group size increases, it becomes easier to
organize a surplus and commit it to enforcement and
monitoring. (Thompson 1977, Agrawal 1992).
Second, smaller communities also find it more
difficult to prevent residents of other villages from
coming and breaking rules related to forest use. In any
dispute with residents of other villages they command
fewer resources.6 The problem becomes especially acute
in the absence of adequate support from the revenue
department and other higher authorities. If a village
community cannot raise sufficient resources to hire a
guard to detect and prevent rule infractions, it is
unlikely to possess the resources needed either to
influence higher level government officials, or to move
the notoriously slow Indian judicial system to resolve
disputes. Thus, on both counts, hiring a guard and
influencing higher level enforcement mechanisms,
smaller communities are disadvantaged?
6 Voluntary labor and monetary contributions may
both be necessary to discourage local rule infractions
and resolve disagreements by arbitration or civil suits.
7 For the selected cases, the per capita material

endowments and forest resources are similar across the
villages. Were there large disparities in the ability of
individual households to make contributions for hiring a
guard, or in the amount of forest resources they
controlled, it is indeed possible that smaller villages
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Kana
(Para/Gare)

The finding that relatively larger groups found it
easier to protect their forests successfully permits us
also to engage the impressive theoretical literature on
the relationship between group size and the probability
of collective action. Olson's seminal work points to the
importance of group size itself in determining whether
collective action will be undertaken. According to him,
"unless the number of individuals in a group is quite
small, or unless there is coercion or some other special
device to make individuals act in their common interest,
rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve
their common or group interests" (1965: 2, emphasis in
original). Focusing on the internal dynamics of groups,
Olson suggests, "the larger the group the farther it will
fall short of providing an optimal supply of a collective
good" (1965: 48). Following Olson's forceful emphasis
on the rational, self-interested individual as the
constituent unit of all groups, later studies also focused
primarily on the individual and his relation to collective
action. In the process, they have ignored the impact of
external relationships of one group with other groups.
The following discussion builds on existing studies
of collective action by making two major points. It
examines the external dynamics of a group with other
groups; and second, it makes a distinction between the
formation of a group and achieving the objective for
which the group was formed.
The logic in considering external dynamics is
devastatingly simple, almost "tautological", as Hardin
(19 81 : 3 8) characterizes part of 0 lson' s argument.
Most villages in the hills already exist as groups.
could protect their forests better than the larger villages.
In selecting the watershed of the river Jataganga, where
villages possess roughly similar resources per capita,
the study controlled for the impact of large differences in
per capita forests and incomes and permitted a focus on
the major variable of interest-- group size.
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Individuals are born into these groups. The choice they
face, then, is not whether to join a group. Rather, they
must choose to not join a group of which they are
already members by birth. Their calculus is not about
the costs of joining; rather, it is about how expensive it
would be not to join. In this situation where individuals
find it more costly to leave the group, rather than to
join, it might seem obvious that larger groups turn out
to be more successful in protecting and managing their
resources.
Larger groups are more successful in two senses. A
group that gains in size as more villagers participate in
its activities is better able to raise more resources and
expend a greater monitoring and enforcement effort.
Two, if there is a number of different groups, some
larger than others, the larger groups are more likely to
be successful. Both propositions in part rely on an
added distinction between organizing collective action
and success in achieving the objective of collective
action.
Most studies on collective action have, by default,
assumed that success in organizing a group (or
collective action), and success in achieving the objective
for which the group (or collective action) is organized,
are one and the same thing. Under many conditions, the
distinction is unnecessary -- perhaps the reason why the
obfuscation of this difference has survived for so long.
But in the case of forest panchayats, successfully
forming a group to protect village forest resources is a
very different proposition from succeeding in protecting
these resources. And while success in forming a group
may come easier to smaller groups, success in
protecting resources is easier for larger groups. What we
should note is that successful collective action is not
just about forming groups, it is about being successful
in achieving the objective for which the group was
formed.
If it is true that as group size increases, the
likelihood of successful collective action may also
increase, a natural question arises: "Would continued
growth in size lead to lower likelihood of success at
some point?" The exact point at which increasing group
size would lead to higher coordination costs, however,
depends on the context in which groups operate (See
Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). In the context of the
uneven topography of the Indian Himalayas, where
natural factors such as limited availability of water,
arable land and forests constrain the growth of villages,
the costs of coordination in existing villages are
unlikely to become extremely high. Most villages
comprise less than 200 households. One can then
hypothesize the following: In small, similar,

communities of poor users who use common pool
resources for subsistence, the likelihood of successful
collectlVe action to protect local resources increases as
group size mcreases. It may however, decline as group
size becomes very large and creates extremely high costs
of coordination.
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The latter part of the hypothesis is based on the
existing literature on collective action rather than on the
data from the studied cases which provide only indirect
indication of what would happen to the likelihood of
collective action as group size becomes extremely large.
It is because costs of coordination would be very high
for groups that are highly dispersed that smaller villages
are unable to join each other to form larger forest
management councils. For example, Kana, Pokhri and
Tangnua are more than six kilometers away from each
other. Very high costs of coordination form a
significant obstacle preventing their attempts to form a
joint management council.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it may be useful to point to some
practical relevance of the research. The findings reported
here draw significance from the most recent trends in
Indian forest policy .8 In a number of statements issued
between 1988 and 1995, the federal Indian government
and the governments of 15 Indian provinces have sought
to increase local participation in the management of
Indian forests (SPWD 1992, Sarin 1995). These Joint
Forest Management statements constitute a break from
the colonial forest policy. Yet the changes introduced
today are far more timid than the British Forest
Panchayat Act of 1931 (Agrawal, 1995b). Most state
policy statements allow local populations only a partial
share in the benefits from protecting forests and do not
permit them a voice in crafting the rules whereby the
forests would be managed (SPWD 1992, GOI 1992,
1993). Without adequate support from enforcement
officials, and without local enforcement capacity to
ensure adequate protection -- two provisions that are
mostly absent from the pronouncements of the Joint
Forest Management policies--prospects of success for
the new policy remain bleak, especially when conflicts
arise.9
In addition, the research indicates that where groups
are very small and compete for a share in local
resources, their performance in protecting resources may
improve if government policies create institutional
incentives for smaller groups to join together. The
attempts of very small groups of the poor to protect
local resources may founder because of limited capacity
to raise a surplus to enable effective local monitoring
and enforcement. Finally, if small groups are also
highly dispersed, the external conditions might make it
8 A number of governments in South Asia, including
Nepal and Bhutan, are attempting to craft comanagement programs with village communities for
more effective forest use and protection.

9 The Indian central and state governments, in
formulating the new forest policy statements, seem,
thus, to have ignored the lessons that the history of the
forest councils offers.

25

very difficult to create institutions through which they
would coordinate their resource management and
protection activities.
The relevance of the research for India is evident in
the context of a declining forest base and changing
forest policies. The research is also significant in the
emerging international debate over the criticality of
local communities and indigenous institutions in
managing forests. The example of the forest
communities in the Indian Himalayas suggests that
autonomy for local communities must be supplemented
by arrangements that will help protect local resources
by creatmg user groups that are not too small, and will
encourage dispute resolution within the same
community and among users from different
communities.
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